We provide new evidence on the impact of housing capital-gains taxation on homeowner behavior by examining residential mobility before and after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which generated the most sweeping reform of capitalgains taxation in the last two decades. In addition to lowering marginal tax rates on long-term capital gains for all assets, TRA97 also eliminated any differential treatment of housing gains above and below age 55, allowing all homeowners to qualify for capital-gains exclusions. Utilizing data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on either side of the law change (1996 and 1998) on homeowners just above (56-58 year olds) and below (52-54 year olds) the age-55 threshold and a reduced-form, quasi-experimental empirical approach, our estimates suggest that the repeal of the differential capital-gains tax treatment by age embodied in TRA97 had an economically important and statistically significant impact on the residential mobility of under-55 homeowners. Across a variety of specifications, the repeal raised the mobility rate by around 1-1.4 percentage points, which, for a mean mobility rate of 4 percentage points, represented an increase in the mobility rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22-31 percent. Furthermore, the bulk of this effect is concentrated among highly mobile homeowners who a priori were more likely to have wanted to trade down (e.g., divorced, empty nesters), those facing higher capital gains tax rates, and those living in states that had experienced higher rates of nominal appreciation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As has been long recognized in the urban and public economics literatures, the U.S. tax code subsidizes owner-occupied housing through the non-taxation of imputed rents, the deduction (for those who itemize) of mortgage-interest payments and property taxes, and the favorable treatment of capital gains. Prior to 1997, gains arising from the sale of a home were treated differently if the seller went on to buy a more (rather than a less) expensive home. In addition, preferential treatment was given based on age: homeowners age 55 or older qualified for a one-time exclusion of $125,000 in calculating taxable gains, while younger homeowners did not qualify for this exclusion.
Both of these provisions have led other researchers to conclude that, de facto, most gains for those over 55 went untaxed (Rosen, 1985; Burman, Wallace, and Weiner, 1996) and to consider the possibility that those under 55 who desired to trade down, buying a less expensive house, might have been effectively "locked-in" to their existing homes by the differential treatment according to age. This would result in a reduction in residential mobility, much as capital-gains taxes on appreciated stocks might reduce realizations, a topic of considerable interest in public and financial economics. 1 However, there is only limited empirical evidence on the extent to which housing capital-gains taxation affects homeowner mobility in the United States. In particular, existing studies that have employed older cross-sectional household survey data (Hoyt and Rosenthal, 1990 ) may have had difficulty separately identifying the impact of the tax treatment from other, unobserved factors that generate cross-sectional differences in outcomes. At the same time, studies that used panel data exploited now distant legislative changes, primarily from the 1970s (Newman and Reschovsky, 1987; Sinai, 1998) .
In this paper, we provide new evidence of the impact of housing capital-gains taxation on mobility by examining homeowner behavior before and after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which generated the most sweeping reform of capitalgains taxation in the last two decades. In addition to lowering marginal tax rates on long-term capital gains for all assets, TRA97 also eliminated any differential treatment of housing gains above and below age 55, allowing all homeowners to qualify for capital-gains exclusions. We utilize data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on either side of the law change (1996 and 1998) on homeowners just above (56-58 year olds) and below (52-54 year olds) the age-55 threshold in a reduced-form, quasi-experimental approach to estimate the impact of the repeal of the age-55 rule on the relative mobility of these two groups of homeowners.
Overall, the empirical evidence we present suggests that the repeal of the agespecific capital-gains tax treatment embodied in TRA97 had an economically important and statistically significant impact on the residential mobility of under-55 homeowners.
Across a variety of specifications, the repeal raised the mobility rate by around 1-1.4 percentage points, which, for a mean mobility rate of 4 percentage points, implies that TRA97 raised the mobility rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22-31%.
Furthermore, the bulk of this effect is concentrated among highly mobile homeowners who a priori were more likely to have wanted to trade down (e.g., divorced, empty nesters), those facing higher capital gains tax rates, and those living in states that had experienced higher rates of nominal appreciation. Interestingly, these findings are generally consistent in magnitude with the estimates of Newman Reschovsky (1987) and Sinai (1998) , who relied on more modest reforms in the 1970s and early 1980s. In combination, these three studies suggest that capital-gains taxation of owner-occupied housing prior to 1997 likely resulted in substantial housing lock-in effects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives background on the tax treatment of housing capital gains before and after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and a brief review of key existing studies of gains taxation on housing behavior. Section III describes the regression framework, CPS, and the construction of the analysis dataset.
Section IV discusses the estimation results. There is a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A capital gain for tax purposes on the primary residence is calculated as the difference between the sale price net of transactions cost and the adjusted tax basis, the latter of which is the purchase price plus the value of tax-qualified improvements. Prior to TRA97, a homeowner was expected to postpone paying capital-gains tax on a sale if the subsequent home, purchased within two years, was of equal or greater value.
Postponed gains were subtracted from the tax basis in the new home. This had the effect of increasing the taxable gain on the new home, should it ever be sold. For example, if an owner sold a home for $200,000 that had been purchased for $150,000, with no improvements, and bought a new home for $225,000, the adjusted tax basis in the new home would be $175,000 (i.e., $225,000-$50,000=$175,000), so that effectively the $50,000 gain in the previous home was transferred to the new home, deferring the tax. Alternatively, if the homeowner traded down, buying a less expensive home, then the difference between the sale price of the previous home and the purchase price of the new home was treated as a taxable gain and taxed in the year of sale. down-sized, and the home had an associated $150,000 taxable gain, the $125,000 exclusion would have reduced the taxable capital gain to just $25,000 (i.e., $150,000-$125,000=$25,000). A 54 year-old homeowner in a similar position would not have been entitled to an exclusion. Therefore, prior to 1997, the federal tax law gave 2 A home seller who moved into rental housing and did not buy a new home within two years paid tax on the entire gain.
3 Note that if a homeowner does not contribute additional equity by buying a more expensive house, the new home simply takes on the smaller of the basis of the previous home or the new home purchase price. 4 With TRA86, the top statutory ordinary income tax bracket was 28%, but was raised by Congress twice in the early 1990s, so that, by 1996, the first year in our sample below, there were three additional brackets, with rates of 31%, 36%, and 39.6%, respectively. The short-term gains' rate applies to assets held for less than 12 months. In 1996, short-term gains were taxed at the ordinary rate, but the rate on long-term gains was capped at 28%, conferring preferential treatment to long-term gains for households in these higher brackets. In the empirical analysis, we use the variation in incentives induced by the enactment of TRA97 and quasi-experimental methods to compare the mobility of 52-54 year-old homeowners-just under the age-55 cut-off-to that of 56-58 year-old homeowners-just over the age-55 cutoff-before (1996) versus after (1998) the law change to test the second of these predictions. In addition, we exploit the fact that mobility is concentrated among certain demographic groups even in the absence of the law change, and then see if these high-mobility groups were differentially affected by TRA97 to help provide evidence that our findings are robust. As a further robustness check, we stratify the sample by rates of house price appreciation and tax rates to see whether households with larger potential tax liabilities also had the largest relative lock-in effect.
Our use of legislative variation in capital-gains tax rules to attempt to identify the impact on mobility is similar to two previous studies. With data from the 1970-81 
III. REGRESSION FRAMEWORK, DATA, AND IDENTIFICATION
The data for our analysis come from the March CPS, which has a number of advantages for examining homeowner mobility. First, it is a standard data source for the study of demography and migration. Second, each March survey is a large, crosssectional, nationally representative sample of households, which yields large analysis datasets, even for relatively narrow age ranges. Third, the March interview asks whether the household moved to a new house over the last year. We use this question to generate our one-year residential mobility rate in an initial difference-in-difference analysis and as our binomial dependent variable in the linear probability model presented at the end of this section. Finally, the Housing Vacancy Survey, which is the official government source for homeownership rates, is a derivative of the CPS, so that the CPS is a natural survey data source to study.
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We use a relatively narrow range of ages on either side of 55 (52-54 and 56-58 year olds) for three reasons. First, as one goes younger in the age distribution, it is more likely that homeowners will want to trade-up for life-cycle reasons, not trade down, and the age-55 rule was only binding for those under 55 who wanted to trade down. Second, as one goes older in the age distribution, retirement and work decisions at older ages begin to drive housing-mobility decisions. The mid-to late-1990s were a period of rapid change in the retirement landscape for workers in their 60's, with a rise in labor force participation after a very long period of secular decline, changes in the Social Security retirement-earnings test, and increased penetration of defined contribution pension plans. We do not want these changes to confound our estimates.
Finally, the key identifying assumption is that in the absence of the repeal of the age-55
rule, the mobility rates of homeowners around age 55 would not otherwise have differed across time. The larger the age range around 55, the less likely this assumption holds.
The questions in the CPS are about income earned in the previous calendar year, so that the income data in the March 1997 and 1999 CPS refer to 1996 and 1998, respectively. Likewise, the mobility questions refer to moves since the previous March.
Therefore, data drawn from the March 1997 CPS refer to behavior before the law change and data drawn from the March 1999 CPS refer to behavior after the law 10 Unfortunately, the CPS does not ask any questions on the value of homes or improvements with which to more finely measure gains, basis, and whether moves resulted in trading-up or trading-down, so that we are not able to test all of the empirical implications of TRA97 for homeowners. We discuss this in greater detail in the conclusion.
change. Because the law was signed in August, 1997 but applied retroactively to home sales in May 1997, we do not use information for 1997 (i.e., from the March 1998, CPS). As a point of departure, we begin with the most basic form of analysis from the quasi-experimental literature: a simple difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the age-55 rule on homeowner mobility, illustrated in Table 2 . The focal group consists of 52-54 year old homeowners, shown in the first row, who were subject to the age-55 rule before, but not after, 1997. The comparison group consists of 56-58 year old homeowners, shown in the second row, who were not subject to the age-55 rule.
We refrain from using the more familiar terms of "treatment" and "control" groups, because all homeowners' capital-gains taxation changed with the law, and, hence, technically, all were "treated" by the law change, although to differing degrees. In particular, the difference-in-difference analysis exploits this differential treatment and measures the relative difference in mobility generated by repeal of the age-55 rule. While the simple analysis in Table 2 suggests that TRA97 had important effects on homeowner mobility, it has an important limitation in that it did not take into account other factors that may have affected mobility and been correlated with the repeal. To control for these, we expand the analysis into a regression framework.
Specifically, we begin with the following specification: The parameter β indicates the differential response in mobility for 52-54 year old homeowners relative to 56-58 year old homeowners before compared with after the law change. It measures this response in a more general way than the simple difference-in-difference analysis in Table 2 by including a full set of age effects ( Z ) and conditioning on other influences ( ). After controlling for age and time effects, the estimate of X β , , is identified off of age-by-time, or year-of-birth, variation. In particular, the identifying assumption is that there were no other factors affecting the relative mobility of 52-54 years old homeowners over time, other than through the law change. If capital-gains taxation locked under-55 homeowners in, then
Likewise, the relative impact of the repeal of the age-55 rule is measured as β − .
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The first two columns of Table 3 present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results from the linear probability model in (1). The first row of the table shows the estimate of β multiplied by 100 to express mobility effects in terms of percentages, rather than decimals, for ease of exposition. 12 Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by year of birth are shown in parentheses.
In column 1, all covariates ( ) are excluded, so that is a regression-based simple difference-in-difference estimate, but, in contrast to 
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One possible challenge to our initial findings is that the capital-gains changes in TRA97 changed the mix of households that were homeowners, and that this change was correlated with mobility but not related to lock-in per se. For example, by creating additional tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing, TRA97 may have drawn marginal 13 The estimated marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood estimation of β in columns 1 and 2 are -0.00919 and -0.00921, respectively. Similarly, the estimated marginal effects from complementary log-log maximum likelihood estimation, which performs better than probit with outcomes that occur relatively rarely, such as mobility, were -0.00919 and -0.00936, respectively, which indicates robustness across estimators.
renters into homeownership, and because changing tenure largely necessitates moving, this could have driven the increase in mobility for 52-54 year olds associated with the reform. To test whether TRA97 actually drew marginal renters into homeownership,
we estimated the models in columns 1 and 2, with the outcome variable being a dummy for homeownership, in effect determining whether homeownership rates were changing in the same direction as homeowner mobility. These results are presented in columns 3
and 4, respectively. The parameter estimate is not statistically different from zero at standard levels of significance and the economic magnitude of the estimate is very small, which suggests that 52-54 year old households just before the law were no more (or less) likely to be homeowners. The results in column 4 show that this finding also holds when we control for being married before and after TRA97. In column 5, we add to the specification two measures that affect housing decisions-the user-cost measure of Green and Vandell (1999) , which, following Engelhardt (2006) , incorporates federal and state tax rates calculated from NBER's TAXSIM calculator for each family, and the real value of the standard deduction for each household's filing status, which may drive a wedge between the marginal and average cost of homeownership. 16 We also include a full set of state dummies and state-by-year interactions to account for location-specific trends in mobility that just might happen to have been correlated with the law change. Now, is statistically different than zero at the 2.2 percent level, and implies a lock-in effect relative to households over 55 of 30.7%.
As a final check on robustness, we estimate the richest specification from column 5 of Table 4 on alternative sets of years. These results are shown in Table 5 .
First, an additional feature of TRA97 was that it changed the holding period to qualify for long-term gains treatment on all assets, including housing, from 12 to 18 months. A year later, as part of a separate law, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (IRSRRA98), the holding period was changed back to 12 months.
In addition, in 1999, both houses of Congress signed the Tax Reform and Reconciliation Act of 1999 (TRRA99), which further lowered the long-term tax rates from 20% and 10% to 18% and 8%, respectively, but President Clinton ultimately vetoed the bill later that year. To make sure the holding period change due to IRSRRA98 and the proposed rate changes in TRRA99 did not somehow contaminate the analysis thus far, which relied on 1998 as the "after" period, we re-estimate the specification using 1996 as the "before" and 2000 as the "after" periods, respectively.
These results are shown in column 1, where . They are qualitatively similar to what was found in Tables 3 and 4 and implies an increase in relative mobility of 22% from the repeal of the age-55 rule.
96 . 0 − = β 15 A description of this program is provided in Feenberg and Coutts (1993) . 16 Again, for homeowners who moved, state refers to the state of residence prior to the move. Tables 2-4 only employ one year of data after the reform, 1998, and, hence, measure a short-term response to the law. To help gauge whether, in the medium-term, in which households had a longer time to adjust their desired housing consumption (Sinai, 1998) , the law had an impact on mobility, we estimate the specification using multiple "after" years, in particular, 1998-2000 and 1998-2002 . The results employing these longer after periods are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 , respectively. Again, the estimates and implied economic effects are qualitatively similar to those in the previous tables, with increases in the mobility rate of about 23% for 52-54 year-old relative to 56-58 year-old homeowners, suggesting important medium-term impacts.
Second, the estimates in
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Estimates for High-Mobility Demographic Groups
If the relative changes in mobility documented in Tables 2-4 are plausibly due to TRA97, then we should expect to see different patterns of response for high versus low mobility homeowners, especially those who otherwise might desire to trade down.
To explore this, we estimate the richest specification from column 5 of Table 4 separately for four demographic groups that have been documented to have high mobility rates-the divorced and widowed, empty-nesters, college-educated, and 17 One common robustness check in quasi-experimental analyses is a regression using data from multiple years only from the "before" period to check for pre-existing differential trends, often called a "pseudodifference-in-difference" estimate. In 1994, the CPS moved to a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) format, updated its sampling frame based on the 1990 Census, introduced a new questionnaire, and instituted a number of other changes to the survey. Pitkin (1998) and Masnick, McArdle, and Belsky (1999) have analyzed the effect of these changes on measured trends in aggregate homeownership in the 1990s using the CPS. They found that, concurrent with these changes, there appears to be an unusually large increase in the number of households and the homeownership rate as measured in the CPS between 1994 and 1996, and that measured changes in homeownership and mobility before versus after 1994 in the CPS may have been spurious. This prevents us from performing a pseudo-difference-in-difference regression for the current study.
white-as well as their complements, the results of which are summarized in Table 6 .
For example, column 1 shows the results when the model is estimated on the subsample of divorced and widowed homeowners, who are highly mobile (Engelhardt, 2003) , may be more likely to be mismatched in their housing consumption and want to trade down (Hanushek and Quigley, 1979) , and, therefore, should have responded more to the law change than their complement, married and never married homeowners, shown in column 2. Indeed, this turns out to be the case:
for the divorced and widowed, is statistically different from zero at the 0.06 percent level, and implies a relative increase in mobility of 89.5%, i.e., almost a doubling, from the repeal of the age-55 rule. In contrast, there is essentially no change in relative mobility for married and never married homeowners: the estimate of 80 . 4 − = β β is economically much smaller, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the relative mobility of 52-54 year-old married and never married homeowners was unaffected by the tax change.
In columns 3 and 4, we look at households with and without children.
Homeowners whose children have left home may be consuming more housing than they desire and are looking to downsize, while families with children in the home are still in their child-rearing phase and may be substantially less likely to trade down.
Consistent with this prediction, the parameter estimate on households with children (column, 4) is half the size for empty-nesters (column 3) and not statistically different from zero.
In the remainder of the table, columns 5 and 6 show a qualitatively similar pattern for those with a college degree or more in education versus those with less than a college degree, respectively. However, the response to TRA97 did not seem to vary by race. Overall, the results in Table 6 show an empirical pattern that is consistent with TRA97 having had an important effect on homeowner mobility.
Estimates Based on Capital-Gains Tax Rates and Nominal Appreciation
As another check that the relative changes in mobility documented in Tables 2-4 are plausibly due to TRA97, we next examine whether mobility is responsive to higher capital-gains tax liability. First, we use NBER's TAXSIM Calculator to calculate the first-dollar marginal long-term capital-gains tax rate the homeowner would face, based on family income, demographics, and the prevailing tax law. We then divide the sample into those who would pay at 15% rate and those who would pay at the 28% rate and estimate the richest specification from column 5 of Table 4 separately. These results are summarized in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 , respectively.
In particular, we would expect that 52-54 year old homeowners in the 28% bracket would have responded more to the elimination of the age-55 rule than those in the 15% bracket because, for any given gain, they faced a larger potential tax liability than those in the 15% bracket. Qualitatively speaking, the results are not inconsistent with this. Namely, in column 1, and is statistically different than zero at the 0.26 percent level implying a relative increase in mobility of 46.1% from the repeal of the age-55 rule for those in the 28% bracket. In comparison, in column 2, , is not statistically different than zero, and implies a smaller relative increase in mobility of 33.3% for those in the 28% bracket. However, the point estimates are sufficiently close and the estimation imprecise enough that there is substantial overlap in the 95%
confidence intervals for these estimates, so that the between-group differences are not as stark as, say, those between marital groups documented in Table 6 .
In another approach, we use the OFHEO constant-quality repeat-sales price indices from each state to calculate the nominal appreciation rate each homeowner would have faced if the home had been occupied for 16 years, which was the median length of residence for 52-58 year-old homeowners in the 1990 Census IPUMS. 18 We then divide the sample into two equal-sized groups, those who lived in states that experienced nominal appreciation above versus below the median nominal appreciation rate in the sample, respectively, and then estimate the richest specification from column 5 of Table 4 separately for these groups. These results are summarized in columns 3
and 4 of Table 7 , respectively.
In particular, we would expect that 52-54 year old homeowners in high appreciation-rate states, who faced a larger potential liability than those in low appreciation-rate states, would have responded more to the elimination of the age-55 rule (than those in the low appreciation-rate states). The results are consistent with this hypothesis. In column 3, and is statistically different from zero at the 3.65 percent level. This implies a relative increase in mobility of 56.0% among those in high appreciation-rate states as a result of the repeal of the age-55 rule. In comparison, in column 2, and is not statistically different than zero, implying a relative decrease in mobility of 1.6% for those in low appreciation-rate states. Therefore, all of
The CPS does not ask homeowners the length of time in residence in the home. The CPS also does not ask at what age the household first purchased a home and even if did, Burman, Wallace, and Weiner (1996) find that only half of all home sellers filed the requisite IRS form 2119 suggesting that households may not be tracking basis across homes. For these reasons, we focus on the expected length of ownership of the current house and not on the sum of lifetime gains. the relative mobility effect is concentrated among under-55 homeowners in states that experienced high rates of nominal appreciation in the 1980s and early-1990s.
Because the tax treatment of capital gains is related to the dollar amount of the nominal gain, and not to the rate of nominal appreciation per se, columns 5 and 6 present a similar analysis in which the sample was split based on the median nominal gain expressed in dollars. These gains were calculated for each state from the OFHEO nominal appreciation rates used in columns 3 and 4, anchored by the median house value for 52-58 year-old homeowners in each state calculated from the 1990 Census IPUMS. The results in columns 5 and 6 show a similar pattern: the relative mobility effect is concentrated among under-55 homeowners in states that experienced high dollar amounts of nominal capital gains.
Finally, Table 8 combines the separate analyses of tax rates and nominal appreciation in Table 7 to see if the relative mobility response by age was concentrated among homeowners who a priori would have been expected to have faced the largest tax liabilities if they wanted to trade down: high-(versus low-) tax rate homeowners within the high-appreciation states. Specifically, we split the sample into four groupshigh tax-rate, high appreciation; high tax-rate, low appreciation; low tax-rate, high appreciation; and low tax-rate, low appreciation-and estimate the model separately for each group, the results of which are shown in columns 1-4, respectively. Panel A of the table shows the estimates of β when the appreciation measure is the nominal appreciation rate; panel B shows the estimates when this measure is the dollar amount of the nominal gain.
The results are mixed. Using the appreciation rate (panel A), the bulk of the relative mobility response by age is concentrated among high tax-rate homeowners in high appreciation-rate states, compared to the other groups. These results are consistent with households distorting their mobility in minimize their tax liability. However, using the imputed dollar amount of the nominal gains (panel B), the relative mobility response by age continues to be concentrated among homeowners in high gain states, consistent with the results in Table 5 , but does not appear to differ by tax rate, as anticipated.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the weight of the empirical evidence suggests that the repeal of the differential capital-gains tax treatment by age embodied in TRA97-the so-called age-55 rule-had an economically important and statistically significant impact on the mobility of under-55 homeowners. Across a variety of specifications, the repeal raised the mobility rate by 22-31%, with the bulk of this effect concentrated among highly mobile homeowners who a priori were more likely to have wanted to trade down (e.g., divorced, empty nesters), those facing higher capital gains tax liabilities. These findings are generally consistent with and extend the conclusions of Newman Reschovsky (1987) and Sinai (1998) that relied on early and more modest reforms in the tax treatment of capital gains from housing.
There are two important caveats. First, while this article presents evidence for the presence of an age-55 lock-in effect by showing a change in relative homeowner mobility before versus after 1997, our estimates technically do not represent the causal impact (in an absolute sense) of gains taxation on mobility because all homeowners were "treated" by the law change. Second, even though the repeal of the age-55 rule induced an increase in the mobility rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22-31%, the flow of these "new" movers is very small relative to the stock of all homeowners, simply because only about 4 percent of homeowners in their 50s move in any given year. This suggests that TRA97 probably did not have a large aggregate impact on housing-market activity.
The principal limitation of the study is its inability to directly observe tradedowns. Because the CPS provides little information about housing, we do not know if increased post-reform mobility of households 52-54 was generated by people moving to less valuable homes. Instead, our analysis is predicated on the assumption that some portion of the population would like to own less housing and that a subset of that group delayed their trading down move to avoid or minimize their tax liability. While the findings presented here are strongly consistent with this hypothesis, we will complement this paper with future research examining housing consumption, tenure and migration utilizing the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of American households aged 50 and older from 1992 to the present. The HRS contains a rich set of demographic, household composition, income and employment questions that will allow us to track changes in housing demand over time and, thus, predict the degree of mismatch between current and desired levels of housing consumption. This will also allow us to assess the extent to which the repeal of the age-55 rule freed suburban homeowners to move to less expensive central city locations, as in Bier, Maric and Weizer (2000) . (1) and (2) present the difference in difference estimates from a linear probability model with dummy variables for year and age and with and without interacted married effects. Columns (3) and (4) present estimates from regress homeownership status on the same set of variables. Standard errors, clustered by year of birth, are in parentheses. (4) were selected based on rate of appreciation in the state OFHEO index between 1996 or 1998 and 1980. Columns (5) and (6) were selected based on the imputed nominal dollar gain of the median priced home from the 1990 census indexed by the state OFHEO series. Standard errors, clustered by year of birth, are in parentheses. All specifications include controls for marital status, number of resident children, educational attainment, race, sex, income, user cost, value of standard deduction, and state dummies interacted with dummy variables for age and year. Parameter estimates in panel A are from observations selected in part based on the rate of appreciation in the state OFHEO index between 1996 or 1998 and 1980. Parameter estimates in Panel B are from observation selected based on the imputed nominal dollar gain of the median priced home from the 1990 census indexed by the state OFHEO series. Standard errors, clustered by year of birth, are in parentheses.
